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ABSTRACT 
 
Macroeconomic Impacts of ALMP on the Matching Process 
in West Germany 
 
This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of job creation schemes and vocational 
training on the matching processes in West Germany. The empirical analysis is based on 
regional data for local employment office districts for the period from 1999 to 2003. The 
empirical model relies on a dynamic version of a matching function augmented by ALMP. In 
order to obtain consistent estimates in the presence of a dynamic panel data model, a first-
differences GMM estimator and a transformed maximum likelihood estimator are applied. 
Furthermore the paper considers the endogeneity problem of the policy measures. The 
results obtained from our estimates indicate that vocational training does not significantly 
affect the matching process and that job creation schemes have a negative effect. 
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 1 Introduction
The evaluation of active labour market policies (ALMP) gained intensely in importance over
the last years in Germany. In the view of the immense spending on ALMP and the persistent
and high unemployment rate, the question whether ALMP helps to improve the situation on
the labour market has become most important for policy makers. Furthermore, the debateable
success of ALMP has additionally enforced the current political discussion whether ALMP is
the suitable tool to solve the unemployment problem.
The econometric evaluation of ALMP is mostly done with data on the individual level (see
e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999)). However, a microeconomic approach using indi-
vidual data usually ignores impacts on non-participants. Therefore the supplementation with
a macroeconomic approach using aggregate data is needed to obtain a complete picture of the
eﬀects of ALMP. In particular, ALMP is often suspected to have a positive eﬀect on the in-
dividual level but a zero or even a negative eﬀect on the whole economy. In this context,
deadweight losses, substitution and displacement eﬀects have received substantial attention in
the literature (see e.g. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) or OECD (1993)). In contrast to
microeconometric studies, the theoretical foundation of the empirical model for a macroecono-
metric evaluation is not straightforward. The reason is that most of the theoretical literature on
ALMP does not provide a model that is applicable for an empirical analysis, because data lim-
itations and immense diﬀerences in the institutional setup of ALMP between countries inhibit
a direct application of the available theories.1
The following empirical analysis of the macroeconomic eﬀects of ALMP will focus on the
matching process which determines the inﬂows into regular employment. The main question is
whether ALMP can improve the matching process, i.e. increase the inﬂows into employment.
Our empirical analysis will rely on the matching function that serves as an approximation of
the matching process.2 The application of the matching function for the empirical analysis is
reasonable since the traditional intention of ALMP is to overcome structural imbalances on the
labour market, i.e. to reduce the mismatch in the labour market. Furthermore, the incorporation
of ALMP into the matching function is well developed.3
The empirical analysis uses regional data for West Germany that allows to estimate the
eﬀects of ALMP with a dynamic model. The application of a dynamic model is done in order to
account for partial adjustment of the matching process. An additional aspect of this work is the
application of adequate estimation methods for dynamic panel data models with ﬁxed eﬀects.
Besides the well known GMM estimation methods we will also present the maximum likelihood
estimator suggested by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002). This maximum likelihood
estimator seems to be superior to the GMM estimators for dynamic panel data models with
ﬁxed eﬀects.
The existing literature on the macroeconometric analysis of ALMP assumes that ALMP is
endogenously determined by a policy reaction function. In this paper we will explicitly consider
this problem in order to ensure consistent estimates of the eﬀects of ALMP.
1A theoretical analysis of the eﬀects of ALMP is given by Calmfors and Lang (1995) and Holmlund and
Linden (1993).
2See e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an overview
3See for example Lehmann (1995), Bellmann and Jackman (1996), Boeri and Burda (1996), Puhani (1999)
and Hagen (2003).
1The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will brieﬂy
present the institutional setup of ALMP in West Germany. Section 3 derives in detail the
matching function augmented by ALMP that is estimated in the empirical analysis. Section 4
discusses the empirical analysis followed by the presentation of the empirical results. Finally,
section 6 concludes and gives an outlook for further research.
2 Active Labour Market Policy in West Germany
Active labour market policies in Germany are organized by the Federal Employment Oﬃce.
Since 1998 the legal basis for active labour market policy is the Social Code SGB III (’Sozialge-
setzbuch’) that has replaced the work support act (’Arbeitsf¨ orderungsgesetz’, AFG) from 1969.
The Federal Employment Oﬃce and the Federal Government spent in 2002 about 12,2 bn
Euro on active labour market policies in West Germany. This is about 27,7 percent of the total
spending on labour market policies. The most important measures in 2002 have been vocational
training (’F¨ orderung der beruﬂichen Weiterbildung’, VT) with 4.04 bn Euro and subsidized
employment, consisting primarily of traditional job creation schemes (’Arbeitsbeschaﬀungsmaß-
nahmen’, JCS) with 0.69 bn Euro. The following analysis will therefore be restricted to job
creation schemes and vocational training programmes. Structural Adjustment Schemes (’Struk-
turanpassungsmaßnahmen’) which are only substantial for East Germany are excluded from the
analysis.
Vocational Training consists of further training and retraining programmes. The objective of
retraining and further training programmes is to adjust the skills of the unemployed to the actual
requirements on the labour market. Additionally further training programmes should provide
an opportunity to ﬁnish a vocational education. The Federal Employment Oﬃce pays the costs
of the training measures and a subsistence allowance to the participants, which amounts to 60
per cent (67 with one or more children) of the previous net income (equal to unemployment
beneﬁt).
Job Creation Schemes are subsidized jobs mostly in non-proﬁt organizations. Major require-
ment for the subsidization is that the activity is of value to the society and additional in nature,
that is without the subsidy they could not be executed. They include limited employment for
long-term unemployed in projects to improve their labour market prospects. Even though JCS
should be co-ﬁnanced measures where between 30% and 75% of the costs are subsidies by the
Federal Employment Oﬃce and the rest is paid by the implementing institution (public or pri-
vate legal entities, mainly municipalities), exceptions can be made in the direction of a higher
subsidy-quota (up to 100%). The subsidy is normally paid for 12 months but can be extended up
to 24 and even 36 months if it is followed by regular employment. An important point regarding
the further analysis is that a participant in a job creation scheme is registered as an employed
person by the Federal Employment Oﬃce, i.e. the person is not registered as unemployed.
Considering the development of the expenditures form 1999 up to 2002, we ﬁnd that the
total expenditures for ALMP increase between 1999 and 2002 with 9.6 percent. Vocational
training increases with 1.6 percent and JCS decreases with -36.7 percent. The major reason for
the decline of JCS can be seen in the budgetary problems of the Federal Employment Oﬃce and
the Federal Government. Furthermore the JCS activity was reduced since the ability of JCS
2to help the unemployed to get back to regular work is rather questionable. Especially latest
empirical evidence on the individual level from Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2003) suggest
that JCS do not have any positive eﬀects on the re-employment probability.
3 The Augmented Matching Function
Key element of our empirical analysis will be a matching function augmented by ALMP. The
matching function serves as an approximation of the matching process in the labour market,
where the matching process is costly and time consuming (Pissarides, 2000). The matching
function determines the inﬂows into regular employment by the stock of unemployed and the
stock of vacancies. For the following we are interested in the question whether ALMP can
improve the matching process by improving the search eﬀectiveness of the unemployed.
Calmfors (1994) gives three explanations how ALMP can help to improve the search ef-
fectiveness. First, ALMP can promote the search intensity of the programme participants by
encouraging them to search more actively. Second, ALMP can speed up the matching process
by upgrading the skills of the participants and by adjusting the skills to the structure of the
labour demand. The latter conﬁrms the traditional intention of ALMP to overcome structural
imbalances on the labour market by adjusting the structure of the labour supply to demand
(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). Third, a programme participation can serve as a substitute for
regular work experience which can reduce the employer’s uncertainty about the employability
of the job applicant (Calmfors, 1994).
Considering standard search theory, an improved search eﬀectiveness of the unemployed does
have several eﬀects on the labour market. First, for a given stock of unemployed and vacancies
the number of matches increases. Assuming a constant quit rate (i.e. the rate at which employed
workers are laid-oﬀ), unemployment decreases and employment increases. Following Calmfors
(1994), this results in a shift of the Beveridge-Curve to the origin, i.e. for a given number of
vacancies there is less unemployment. Therefore ALMP can lower unemployment if the source
of a high unemployment rate are structural imbalances in the labour market. Note that in a
situation where high labour costs are responsible for a high unemployment rate an improved
matching process can have only marginal eﬀects. This point is extremely important for Germany,
since high labour costs seem to be the major reason for the high unemployment rate.
Additionally, there are also eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s employment decision and the wage setting
process. An improved matching process shortens the time a vacancy remains open. Since this
reduces the costs of maintaining a vacancy, ﬁrms will declare more vacancies which is equivalent
to an increase of the labour demand. On the one hand, the higher labour demand rises the
probability for the workers to get a suitable job oﬀer. This enhances the position of the workers
in a wage bargaining process and therefore leads to an upward pressure on the wages. On the
other hand, the shorter time a vacancy remains open leads to a better bargaining position for
the ﬁrm, since laid-oﬀ workers can be replaced quicker. This enables the ﬁrm to negotiate lower
wages at each level of employment (Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstr¨ om, 2002). Therefore the
rise of the labour demand, due to the improved matching process, results in higher employment
whereas the eﬀect on the wages is ambiguous.
ALMP programmes are also expected to have negative eﬀects on the matching process. Espe-
3cially locking-in eﬀects seem to be of major importance. If an ALMP programme is associated
with full time employment like most JCS programmes, the time remaining for an active job
search is reduced (Holmlund and Linden, 1993). Therefore it is reasonable to expect a lower
search eﬀectiveness for the participants currently being placed in a programme compared to the
participants after programme participation. Furthermore, in this case a positive eﬀect of ALMP
can only result from a positive after-programme eﬀect that compensates a negative locking-in
eﬀect.
Besides the eﬀects on the matching process there are several other channels how ALMP
can aﬀect the labour market. For example eﬀects on the productivity, the labour supply, the
competition in the labour market and reduced welfare losses of unemployment. The analysis of
the matching process is therefore a partial-analytic approach which concentrates only on one
aspect of the eﬀects of ALMP. As the following empirical analysis investigates only the eﬀects on
the matching process we omit a discussion of alternative channels. A comprehensive presentation
of the diﬀerent eﬀects of ALMP can be found in Calmfors (1994) and Calmfors, Forslund, and
Hemstr¨ om (2002).
In order to analyse the eﬀects of ALMP on the matching process we will derive a matching
function augmented by ALMP as suggested by Lehmann (1995) and Puhani (1999). Using a
usual Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation we can write the augmented matching function as:
h = Av¯v(cu)¯u; (1)
where h are the outﬂows from unemployment into regular employment relative to the labour
force, v are the vacancies relative to the labour force, u are the unemployed relative to the
labour force, A is a scale parameter and c is a search eﬀectiveness index. The scale parameter
A is interpreted as a mismatch parameter that captures several determinants of the matching
process. Amongst others these determinants can be the diﬀerences in geographic and skill
characteristics as well as the preferences and the institutional set incentives which inﬂuences the
search behaviour (Puhani, 1999). cu deﬁnes the search eﬀective stock of the unemployed, where
c is aﬀected by AMLP. The basic idea is that ALMP helps to rise the number of unemployed
who search eﬀectively for a job. In order to introduce ALMP into the matching function we
deﬁne the parameter c as:
c = ¹(1 + µ) with µ =
J X
j=1
¿jpj
The parameter ¹ denotes the search eﬀectiveness of the unemployed in the absence of ALMP
and µ is the impact of the ALMP programmes on the search eﬀectiveness. The general eﬀect µ
can be decomposed into the several eﬀects ¿i of the diﬀerent ALMP measures pj. The ALMP
measure pj can either be deﬁned as the number of participants in ALMP programmes, or can
be deﬁned as the expenditures on ALMP. In our empirical analysis we will use the number
of participants in JCS and VT relative to the labour force. The marginal eﬀect of the policy
measure on the search eﬀectiveness is given by: @c
@pi = ¹¿i.
The log-linearized form of equation (1)
4lnh = lnA + ¯v lnv + ¯u lnu + ¯u ln(¹(1 + µ))
can be approximated for small µ as:
lnh = A¤ + ¯v lnv + ¯u lnu + ¯u
J X
j=1
¿jpj (2)
where A¤ = lnA + ¯u ln¹.
In our analysis we do not only diﬀerentiate between JCS and VT but also include the programme
measures with several lags. The reason is that we want to account for the locking-in eﬀect of
ALMP. Unfortunately, our aggregate data does not allow a diﬀerentiation between participants
currently being placed in a programme and participants after programme participation. There-
fore, we include several lags of the ALMP measures in order to obtain the net eﬀect, i.e. the
eﬀect that incorporates the locking-in eﬀect and the after programme eﬀect.
4 Empirical Analysis
For the empirical analysis of the eﬀects of JCS and VT we use data for 141 regions in West
Germany. The regional units are deﬁned by the administrative areas of the local oﬃces of the
Federal Employment Oﬃce. The time range reaches from the ﬁrst quarter in 1999 to the ﬁrst
quarter in 2003, i.e. for each region we face a time series of 17 quarters. The descriptive statistics
for the data can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min Max Mean Std.
Number of labour oﬃce districts: 141
Number of observations: 2397
Time Range: 1999:1 - 2003:1 (Quarterly Data)
Inﬂows from Unemployment into Employment 909 15578 3430 1884
Participants in JCS 2 2181 313 315
Participants in VT 135 8500 1395 906
Unemployment 3318 88317 17443 11424
Vacancies 383 29755 2849 2547
Labour Force 58974 1007761 202401 121036
The augmented matching function we seek to estimate is given by:
lnhit = A¤
it + ¯v lnvit¡1 + ¯u lnuit¡1 + Á(L)JCSit + '(L)V T it; (3)
where hit are the outﬂows from unemployment into employment relative to the labour force, vit
and uit are the vacancy and the unemployment rate relative to the labour force, JCSit and V Tit
are the policy measures for both ALMP programmes and i and t are the indices for the region
and the time. Á(L) = Á1L + Á2L2 + Á3L3 + Á4L4 and '(L) = '1L + '2L2 + '3L3 + '4L4 are
associated polynomials in the lag operator. The variable A¤
it captures the remaining explanatory
variables for hit
5Ait = A + ° lnhit¡1 + Zt + ¹i + ±t + eit;
where A is a constant, Zt is a vector of seasonal dummies, ¹i is a ﬁxed eﬀect (the regional
unobserved heterogeneity), t is a time trend and eit is a residual varying over t and i. Further-
more, we use a dynamic speciﬁcation in order to account for partial adjustment in the matching
process.
The empirical model combines stock and ﬂow data where monthly data is aggregated to
quarterly data. The ﬂow data, i.e. the outﬂows from unemployment into employment in t result
from the sum of the outﬂows over the three months of the associated quarter. The stock data
that is used to calculate the unemployment and the vacancy rate results from the last month of
the associated quarter, i.e. the stock refers to the end of the quarter.
If hit is measured as a ﬂow over a time period, and uit and vit as stocks at some point
during the period, uit and vit are depleted by hit and thus are endogenously determined with
respect to hit (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). In particular it is reasonable to assume that
E(eituis) 6= 0 and E(eitvis) 6= 0 for s ¸ t and zero otherwise. That is the uit and vit are
independently distributed conditionally only on future values of eit. In order to avoid the
simultaneity problem we include the unemployment and the vacancy rate with one lag. This
is also reasonable, since the lagged unemployment and vacancy rate refers to the stock that is
available at the beginning of the period. The lagged unemployment and vacancy rate can be
treated as a weak exogenous variable, as weak exogeneity requires that only future values of the
regressor are correlated with the residual. That is the residual eit is independently distributed
conditional on current and lagged values of uit¡1 and vit¡1 but not of their future values.
As ALMP measure we use the participants in JCS and VT relative to the labour force. In
order to account for the fact that participants in JCS are registered as employed, we added
them to the stock of unemployed and subtracted the inﬂows into JCS from the outﬂows from
unemployment into employment.
The stock of participants that is used to calculate the participation rate, refers also to the
end of the quarter. Therefore the participation rates are included at least with one lag, since
the lagged participation rate denotes the participation rate at the beginning of the period t.
Furthermore both ALMP measures are included up to the fourth lag, which is reasoned by a
mean duration of the programmes between 8 and 12 months.
The setup of the model and the data also avoids the simultaneity problem of ALMP which is
a major issue in the estimation of the eﬀects of ALMP. Generally, ALMP is assumed to be deter-
mined by a policy reaction function where the inﬂows into employment could be one argument
besides others (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).4 Most empirical studies of the macroeconomic
eﬀects of ALMP use instrumental variable estimators in order to account for the endogeneity
problem.5 The major problem of this approach is that an adequate set of instruments is apriori
unknown or not available due to data limitations. That is, the available instruments have hardly
any predictive power for the ALMP measures or are correlated with the residual term of the
regression equation. For our empirical analysis we can avoid such questionable instrumentation
4See Blien (2002) for an extensive discussion of the allocation process for the funds spent on ALMP.
5See for example Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), Boeri and Burda (1996) and Hagen (2003).
6strategies since it is reasonable to assume that the participants in ALMP at the beginning of
the period are not determined by the matches of the same period. In particular, we assume for
the ALMP measures a similar correlation structure as for the unemployment and the vacancy
rate. That is we assume that E(eitJCSis) 6= 0 E(eitV Tis) 6= 0 for s ¸ t and zero otherwise.
Thus we can treat the lagged policy measures as weak exogenous variables.
The estimation of the model (3) with the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator for
ﬁnite T is inconsistent due to the incidental parameter problem. Only for T tending to inﬁnite
the LSDV is consistent. In order to get around the incidental parameter problem one may write
the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences where the ﬁxed eﬀects are removed:
∆lnhit = ±+°∆lnhit¡1+¯v∆lnvit¡1+¯u∆lnuit¡1+Á(L)∆JCSit+'(L)∆V T it+∆Zt+∆eit
(4)
In this equation we face the problem that E(∆lnhit¡1∆eit) 6= 0 , E(∆JCSit¡1∆eit) 6= 0,
E(∆V T it¡1∆eit) 6= 0, E(∆uit¡1∆eit) 6= 0 and E(∆vit¡1∆eit) 6= 0. The ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests to use lagged levels as instruments
for the lagged dependent and the explanatory variables. In particular the available moment
conditions are:
E(∆eit lnhit¡g) for g = 2;3¢¢¢;t ¡ 1
E(∆eitJCSit¡1¡g) for g = 1;2¢¢¢;t ¡ 2
E(∆eitJCSit¡1¡g) for g = 1;2¢¢¢;t ¡ 2
E(∆eit lnuit¡1¡g) for g = 1;2¢¢¢;t ¡ 2
E(∆eit lnvit¡1¡g) for g = 1;2¢¢¢;t ¡ 2
The time trend and the seasonal dummies are strictly exogenous variables and are simply in-
strumented by themselves.
Unfortunately, using all available moment conditions leads to a huge number of overidentifying
restrictions. This is because the above moment conditions use the complete history of the
variables as instruments. The application of too many moment conditions may lead to an
overﬁtting bias (Bond, 2002). Furthermore, the calculation of the associated two-step estimates
can become problematic if the number of regional units is below the number of instruments. In
order to reduce the number of moment conditions we have excluded all instruments before t¡4.
As discussed by Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000), the ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) tends to be biased if the autoregressive parameter is near
unity.6 However, as our dependent variable results from ﬂow data, large autoregressive coeﬃ-
cients near unity are very unlikely. But the application of the ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM estimator
becomes problematic in the case where the variance of the regional eﬀects is too large relative
to the variance of eit. The reason is that the utilization of variables in levels as instruments for
variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences is rather problematic in this case. If the variables in levels are for a
major part driven by the regional eﬀect, the predictive power for variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences is
6In the extreme case of a unit root process, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM estimator breaks down completely.
7very poor. Ahn and Schmidt (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) have proposed additional
moment conditions to overcome this problem. Unfortunately those moment conditions require
the identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients for the ﬁxed eﬀects and therefore do not solve the incidental
parameter problem.7
For the estimation of linear dynamic panel data models with ﬁxed eﬀects Hsiao, Pesaran, and
Tahmiscioglu (2002) have suggested a transformed maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). This
estimator is more eﬃcient than the ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM estimator and does perform well in the
case of near unit roots.8 Furthermore it also performs better in the case where the variance of
the regional eﬀects is large relative to the variance of eit. A detailed presentation of the MLE can
be found in the Appendix. One major advantage of the MLE is that we can account explicitly
for the weak exogeneity of the lagged explanatory variables without using a huge number of
overidentifying restrictions, as it is the case for the ﬁrst-diﬀerence GMM estimator. Additional
to the ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM estimator and the MLE we also will present the results from the
LSDV estimator in order to assess the robustness of our results.
5 Results
Table 2 contains the estimation results for the MLE, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences GMM (GMM-DIF)
estimator and the LSDV estimator. Furthermore, Table 2 also presents the results from an
LSDV estimator for a static model where the lagged dependent is excluded. We also present
the results from a Wald test of joint signiﬁcance, a Wald test for constant returns of scale of the
augmented matching function, a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and a test for ﬁrst
and second order serial correlation.9 The absence of second order serial correlation is crucial
for the orthogonality conditions of the GMM DIF to be valid. Since the test for second order
serial correlation does not allow a rejection of the null hypothesis, the results from the GMM
estimators should be handled with care. The set of instruments for the GMM DIF cannot be
rejected by the Sargan test. But, due to the relatively large time dimension and the weak
exogeneity assumption of the lagged explanatory variables, the number of instruments used for
the GMM estimators is very large and exceeds the number of regions although the history is
restricted. The presented results for the GMM estimator are the associated two-step estimates.
Monte Carlo simulations have shown that the standard errors of the two-step estimates are
downward biased.10 This is because the standard expression for the asymptotic variance ignores
the presence of the estimated parameters in the weight matrix (Bond and Windmeijer, 2002). In
order to overcome this problem we apply the ﬁnite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer
(2000). Monte Carlo results have shown that the corrected variance of the two-step estimator
often provides more reliable inference with size proportions similar to those of the one-step
variance (Bond and Windmeijer, 2002).
For the MLE we present the additional estimates for the projection parameters ¸, and the
variance ratio ! = ¾2
»=¾2
u, both deﬁned in the Appendix. In contrast to the GMM estimator,
the calculation of the MLE seems not to suﬀer from the relatively large time dimension. We
7Note that all these estimators were developed for the random eﬀects model.
8See the Monte-Carlo results from Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002).
9The test for ﬁrst and second order serial correlation was suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and is
asymptotically normal distributed.
10See for example Arellano and Bond (1991).
8used the estimates from the minimum distance estimator (MDE) suggested by Hsiao, Pesaran,
and Tahmiscioglu (2002) as starting values for the Newton-Raphson algorithm to compute the
MLE.11
Considering the estimates for the autoregressive parameter of the dynamic model, we ﬁnd
throughout a small but signiﬁcant negative estimate. Comparing the diﬀerent estimators we ﬁnd
for the MLE the highest estimate and for the GMM-DIF estimator the lowest estimate. Since
the LSDV estimate for the autoregressive parameter is downward biased, the results from the
MLE seem to be more reliable compared to the results from the GMM-DIF and LSDV estimator.
Furthermore the LSDV estimator seems to be superior to the GMM-DIF estimator in our case.
A major problem for the GMM-DIF estimator seems to be the relatively large time dimension
and the presence of second order serial correlation. With respect to the LSDV estimator it
should be borne in mind that the relatively large time dimension weakens the problems of the
LSDV estimator in the case of a dynamic model. This might be one reason for the rather similar
results of the LSDV estimator and MLE.
An important question that arises is whether a negative coeﬃcient for the lagged dependent
variable is reasonable. One argument might be that a period of high matching activity is followed
by a period with a lower matching activity because the labour market has cleared. On the other
hand, a comparison of the results from the static model shows only moderate diﬀerences between
the estimates from the static and the dynamic model. Therefore, the application of a dynamic
model seems not to be crucial for the results. However, as a Wald test for ° = 0 does not
reject the null hypothesis for all estimators, we take the dynamic model as the appropriate
speciﬁcation.12
Generally we can state that the MLE seems to produce the most reliable results compared
to the LSDV and the GMM-DIF estimator. Considering the Wald test of joint signiﬁcance we
ﬁnd the largest statistic for the MLE, which might be seen as an evidence for a more eﬃcient
estimate.
Turning to the parameters for the unemployment and vacancies rate, we ﬁnd, as expected, a
positive and signiﬁcant parameter for both variables. A Wald test for the restriction ¯u+¯v = 1
rejects the hypothesis that the augmented matching function exhibits constant returns of scale.
It is noteworthy that the coeﬃcient for the vacancy rate is relatively small compared to the
coeﬃcient for the unemployment rate. The reason might be that our data includes only those
vacancies that are registered by the employment oﬃces.13 Therefore, the vacancy rate in our
data set is systematically underestimated and should only be interpreted as an approximation
of the real vacancy rate.
For all estimators we ﬁnd a negative trend and highly signiﬁcant seasonal dummies. The
negative trend is conﬁrmed by the latest rise of the unemployment rate in West Germany.
Considering the coeﬃcients for the ALMP measures we will use the cumulated lag coeﬃcients
and the long run multiplier for the interpretation (see also Hujer, Blien, Caliendo, and Zeiss
(2002)). Table 3 shows the cumulated lag coeﬃcients and the long run multipliers for JCS and
VT for the MLE, the GMM-DIF and the LSDV estimator.
For JCS we ﬁnd for all estimators a negative and signiﬁcant impact at t+1 that holds up to
11A description of the MDE can be found in the Appendix.
12Results from a Wald test for the restriction ° = 0: MLE 7.31, GMM-DIF 42.45 and LSDV 35.03.
13This problem is extensively discussed by Franz and Smolny (1994).
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10Table 3: Cumulated Lag Coeﬃcients for the eﬀects of ALMP
JCS FBW
MLE GMM DIF LSDV MLE GMM DIF LSDV
JCS t + 1 -0.5418 -0.5337 -0.4714 0.2069 0.3328 0.2136
(t-value) (-6.40) (-4.09) (-4.55) (6.14) (5.98) (4.94)
t + 2 -0.5529 -0.5369 -0.4891 0.0678 0.2182 0.0778
(t-value) (-6.87) (-3.66) (-4.04) (2.02) (3.89) (2.02)
t + 3 0.1903 -0.0193 0.2104 0.0311 0.2167 0.0241
(t-value) (2.24) (-0.17) (2.91) (0.8) (3.66) (0.68)
t + 4 -0.1816 -0.1088 -0.1896 0.0349 0.3122 0.0415
(t-value) (-3.08) (-0.93) (-3.2) (0.94) (3.35) (1.03)
t + 5 -0.1618 -0.0938 -0.1417 0.0347 0.2961 0.0394
(t-value) (-2.76) (-0.90) (-2.48) (0.95) (3.49) (1.04)
t + 6 -0.1629 -0.0963 -0.1475 0.0347 0.2988 0.0396
(t-value) (-2.78) (-0.91) (-2.58) (0.95) (3.46) (1.04)
t + 7 -0.1628 -0.0959 -0.1468 0.0347 0.2984 0.0396
(t-value) (-2.78) (-0.91) (-2.57) (0.95) (3.47) (1.04)
long run -0.1628 -0.0959 -0.1468 0.0346 0.2984 0.0396
(t-value) (-2.78) (-0.91) (-2.56) (0.94) (3.47) (1.04)
t+2. At t+3 we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect and ﬁnally at t+4 a negative eﬀect that remains for future
periods. The long run multiplier is negative signiﬁcant, i.e. JCS does reduce the number of new
matches. This means that JCS is not only an ineﬀective tool to improve search eﬀectiveness of
the unemployed but also worsens the situation. This result conﬁrms to latest microeconometric
evidence from Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2003), where a negative eﬀect of JCS on the
individual level was found for West Germany. The positive eﬀect at t+3 interestingly coincides
with the mean duration of an JCS programme. If an unemployed enters a JCS programme he
or she leaves the programme on average after 12 Months, i.e. at t+3.14 This can be seen as an
evidence for the presence of a locking-in eﬀect of JCS. Comparing the results from the diﬀerent
estimators we ﬁnd similar results for the static model and for the MLE and the LSDV estimator.
Only for the GMM-DIF estimator we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant negative eﬀect.
For VT we do ﬁnd for all estimators a positive signiﬁcant impact at t+1. Whereas this eﬀect
vanishes very rapidly for the MLE and the LSDV estimator, it remains positive signiﬁcant only
for the GMM-DIF estimator. The results from the static model are again rather similar to the
results from the MLE and LSDV estimator. The long run multiplier is only for the GMM-DIF
estimator positive signiﬁcant and positive insigniﬁcant for the remaining estimators. Therefore
we can conclude that VT is not able to rise the search eﬀectiveness of the unemployed. In
contrast to JCS we do not ﬁnd an evidence for a deterioration of the labour market situation
due to the presence of VT. Furthermore, we cannot ﬁnd a pattern that could be associated with
a locking-in eﬀect of VT.
6 Conclusion
We were interested in estimating the eﬀects of ALMP on the matching process in West Germany.
Aggregate data for 141 West German local employment oﬃce districts for the time span from
1999 to 2003 was used to estimate the eﬀects of job creation schemes and vocational training on
the matching process. The empirical analysis was based on a dynamic version of the augmented
14See Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2003), Table A.3.
11matching function. In order to obtain reliable estimates from the dynamic panel data model we
applied the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the maximum likelihood
estimator suggested by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002).
The results with respect to job creation schemes are negative and signiﬁcant. Therefore, we
ﬁnd that job creation schemes reduce the search eﬀectiveness of the unemployed, i.e. reduce
the inﬂows from unemployment into employment. For vocational training we obtain positive
but insigniﬁcant results. Thus, vocational training seems to be ineﬀective to improve the search
eﬀectiveness of the unemployed.
The ineﬀectiveness of vocational training to rise the number of new matches may be ex-
plained with the latest development of the labour market situation in West Germany. The high
unemployment rate in Germany that obviously results from a shortage of the labour demand,
leads to a situation where vocational training can hardly improve the labour market situation.
This is because vocational training is intended to aﬀect the structure of the labour supply and
thus cannot solve the problems on the labour demand side.
For the results concerning job creation schemes it should be emphasized that the negative
eﬀect of job creation schemes cannot only be justiﬁed by the actual labour market situation. The
major reason of the negative eﬀects of job creation seem to be problems that are associated with
the institutional setup of the programmes. For example the requirement that the created job is
additional may reduce the employability of the participants with respect to a regular job, since
the there are too large diﬀerences in the skill characteristics between a created and a regular
job. Furthermore, the relatively long duration of the programmes seems to be problematic in
the presence of locking-in eﬀects.
A major criticism concerning macroeconometric evaluations is that eﬀects of ALMP may
be too small to detect them in the noise of aggregation. However, due to the large scale pro-
grammes in Germany, eﬀects of ALMP on the whole economy are likely and should therefore
be investigated. From our point of view, especially macroeconometric evaluations that consider
the ALMP eﬀect on the whole labour market situation are needed. Here we think of general
equilibrium models that are applicable for an empirical analysis and allow not only to assess the
total eﬀect but also the diﬀerent channels of the eﬀect of ALMP.
Finally, it should be noted that a complete evaluation process requires both, a micreconomet-
ric evaluation and a microeconometric evaluation. Ideally, a microeconometric and a macroe-
conometric evaluation should be based on the same data source in order to ensure comparable
results.
12A Appendix
A.1 The ﬁxed eﬀects MLE and MDE for K weak exogenous regressors
The following section gives a detailed description of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
suggested by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002). Furthermore, we will extend the notation
of Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) in order to consider a dynamic panel data model
with ﬁxed eﬀects containing K weak exogenous (or predetermined) regressors.15 Consider the
following linear dynamic panel data model:
yit = ai + °yit¡1 + Xit¯ + uit (A.1)
yit is the dependent variable, Xit is a (1 £ K) vector of weak exogenous regressors and ai is
the individual speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. Weak exogenous means that E(Xituis) 6= 0 for s < t, i.e.
the residual uit is independently distributed of current and lagged values of Xit but not of their
future values. Furthermore, we assume that the initial values yi0 and Xi0 are observable. To
remove the ﬁxed eﬀect ai we consider the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
∆yit = °∆yit¡1 + ∆Xit¯ + ∆uit (A.2)
In order to ﬁnd the likelihood we deﬁne ∆Wit = (∆yit;∆Xit) and ∆Ψit =
(∆Wit;∆Wit¡1;¢¢¢;∆Wi1) where ∆Ψi0 is normalized to unity (Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmis-
cioglu, 2002). Therefore ∆Ψit contains the whole history of ∆Wit up to the point t. The joint
density for ∆Wit conditional on this history is given by:
f(∆WiTjΨiT¡1)f(∆WiT¡1j∆ΨiT¡2)¢¢¢f(∆Wi2j∆Ψi1)f(∆Wi1)
Since
f(∆WitjΨit¡1) = f(∆yitjXit;Ψit¡1)f(∆Xitj;Ψit¡1);
the relevant part of the likelihood is simply given by:
N Y
i=1
T Y
t=1
f(∆yitj∆Xit;Ψit¡1) (A.3)
For t = 2;¢¢¢;T the density for ∆yit is fully speciﬁed by (A.2). The problem that remains is to
ﬁnd the density for the initial observation, f(∆yi1j∆Xi1), that does not depend on incidental
parameters.
Backward substitution gives an expression for ∆yi1 (assuming the process has started in ¡m):
∆yi1 = °m∆yi;¡m+1 +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j∆Xi;1¡j¯ +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j∆ui;1¡j (A.4)
Taking expectations conditional on ∆yi;¡m+1 and ∆Xi;1;∆Xi;0;¢¢¢;Xi;¡m we get:
E [∆yi1j∆yi;¡m+1;∆Xi;1;∆Xi;0;¢¢¢;Xi;¡m] = °m∆yi;¡m+1 +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j∆Xi;1¡j¯
15The case of one strict exogenous regressor is presented by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002).
13Since ∆Xi;1¡j for j = 1;2;¢¢¢;m is not available, E [∆yi1j∆yi;¡m+1;∆Xi;1;∆Xi;0;¢¢¢;Xi;¡m]
is unknown. Treating this expected value as a free parameter to be estimated will again result
in an incidental parameter problem. In order to specify the expected value as a function of ﬁnite
parameters, Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) suggest to write them as a function of the
observable regressors. In what follows Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) assume either:
Assumption i: j°j < 1 and m ! 1, i.e. the process has started a long time ago. Then
E(∆yi;¡m+1j∆Xi1) = 0, or
Assumption ii: m is ﬁnite, that is the process has started quite recently and the expected
value E(∆yi;¡m+1j∆Xi1) is the same across i.
Note that Assumption ii only requires that the expected changes in the initial endowments are
the same across i, and does not require that j°j < 1 (Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu, 2002).
The expected value of ∆yi1 conditional on the ∆Xi1 is given by:
E(∆yi1j∆Xi1) = b¤ + E
2
4
m¡1 X
j=0
°j∆Xi;1¡j¯j∆Xi1
3
5 + E
2
4
m¡1 X
j=0
°j∆ui;1¡jj∆Xi1
3
5 (A.5)
where b¤ = 0 under i and b¤ = b under ii. Since we assume that Xit is weak exogenous we can
only use ∆Xi1 as regressors for the conditional expected value for ∆yi1.
Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) suggested a projection technique in order to get a
computable expression for expected values in equation (A.5). The elements of the sum of ﬁrst
expected value in equation (A.5) can be projected with:
E(∆Xi1¡jj∆Xi1) = gj + ∆Xi1Ψj
where Ψj is a (K £K) matrix and gj is a (1£K) vector. In our case Ψj and gj depend not only
on the autocovariances of the processes determining Xit. Additionally independencies between
the processes of the regressors determine the structure of Ψj. In the extreme case of independent
processes determining Xit the oﬀ-diagonal elements of Ψj would be zero.
For the elements of the sum of the second expected value in equation (A.5) we write:
E(∆u1¡jj∆X1i) = dj + ∆Xi1'j
where dj is a scalar and 'j is a (K£1) vector. The elements in dj and 'j can be derived from the
joint distribution of (Xi1;Xi0;Xi;¡1;¢¢¢;ui1;ui0;ui;¡1;¢¢¢), (Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu,
2002)
The projection technique suggested by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) allows Xit to
follow trend stationary and ﬁrst diﬀerence stationary data generating processes. Important is
however, that the process generating Xit does not follow diﬀerent trends (stochastic or determin-
istic) for diﬀerent i. In this case the expected value would not be a function of ﬁnite parameters,
14i.e. the incidental parameter problem could not be solved and inconsistent estimates would be
the result for ﬁnite T.16
Inserting the projections into equation (A.5) we get
E(∆yi1j∆Xi1) = b¤ +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j [gj + ∆Xi1Ψj]¯ +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j [dj + ∆Xi1'j] (A.6)
Therefore, we can write for ∆yi1 the following simpliﬁed expression:
∆yi1 = ¸0 + ∆Xi1¸1 + »i1 (A.7)
where ¸0 and ¸1 (K £ 1) are unknown coeﬃcients. The parameters ¸0 and ¸1 are functions of
b¤;¯;°;gj;Ψj;dj and 'j. The residual »i1 with E(»i1jXi1) = 0 is deﬁned as
»i1 = ∆yi1 ¡ E(∆yi1j∆Xi1)
The expression for »i1 can be obtained from (A.4) and (A.6).
»i1 = (°m∆yi;¡m+1 ¡ b¤) +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j f∆Xi;1¡j ¡ [gj + ∆Xi1Ψj]g¯ +
m¡1 X
j=0
°j f∆ui;1¡j ¡ [dj + ∆Xi1'j]g
Therefore E(»2
i1) = ¾2
», E(»i1∆ui2) = ¡¾2
u and E(»i1∆uit) = 0 for t = 3;4;¢¢¢;T.
In our empirical application we additionally have to consider two points:
1. The expected value of seasonal dummies and a time trend E(∆Z1j∆Z1;¢¢¢;∆ZT) is a
constant, and is therefore captured by the parameter ¸0.
2. In our empirical model the policy measures, the unemployment and vacancy rate are
variables for which we assume that E(hitpis) 6= 0, E(hituis) 6= 0 and E(hitvis) 6= 0 for
s ¸ t and zero otherwise. In this case the variables can be treated as weak exogenous
variables if they are included with one lag.
A.2 The likelihood function
Let Á = (¸0;¸1;°;¯)0 and
∆Qi =
0
B B
B
B B
@
1 ∆Xi1 0 0
0 0 ∆yi1 ∆Xi2
0 0 ∆yi2 ∆Xi3
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ∆yiT¡1 ∆XiT
1
C C
C
C C
A
The variance covariance matrix is given by:
16Notice that in this case the projection would depend on i, i.e. E(∆Xi1¡jj∆Xi1) = gi;j + ∆Xi1Ψi;j
15Ω = ¾2
uΩ¤ = ¾2
u
0
B
B B
@
! ¡1 0 ¢¢¢ 0
¡1 2 ¡1 ¢¢¢ 0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 0 ¢¢¢ 2
1
C
C C
A
where ! = ¾2
»=¾2
u.
Following Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) the Likelihood function is then given by:
lnL = ¡
NT
2
ln(2¼)¡
NT
2
ln(¾2
u)¡
N
2
lnjΩ¤j¡
1
2
N X
i=1
£
(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)0Ω¡1(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)
¤
(A.8)
where jΩ¤j = 1 + T(! ¡ 1).
The ﬁrst order conditions for Á;¾2
u and ! are:17
@ lnL
@Á
=
N X
i=1
£
∆QiΩ¡1(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)
¤
@ lnL
@¾2
u
= ¡
NT
2¾2
u
+
1
2¾4
u
N X
i=1
£
(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)0(Ω¤)¡1(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)
¤
@ lnL
@!
= ¡
NT
2[1 + T(! ¡ 1)]
+
1
2¾2
u[1 + T(! ¡ 1)]2
N X
i=1
[(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)0(vv0)(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)]
where v0 = (T;T ¡ 1;¢¢¢;2;1).18
Setting the ﬁrst order conditions to zero we obtain:
ˆ Á =
Ã
N X
i=1
∆QiΩ¡1∆Qi
!¡1 Ã
N X
i=1
∆QiΩ¡1∆yi
!
(A.9)
ˆ ¾2
u =
1
NT
N X
i=1
£
(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)0(Ω¤)¡1(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)
¤
(A.10)
ˆ ! =
T ¡ 1
T
+
1
¾2
uNT 2
N X
i=1
[(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)0(vv0)(∆yi ¡ ∆QiÁ)] (A.11)
The MLE for (Á;¾2
u;!) can be found by maximizing of the log-likelihood function (A.8) by
an iterative procedure like Newton-Raphson. Alternatively Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu
(2002) suggest to compute ˆ Á and ˆ ¾2
u for diﬀerent values of ˆ !, and to choose that ˆ ! that globally
maximises the log-likelihood.
17The second derivatives can be found in Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) pp. 144-145.
18See also the deﬁnition for (Ω¤)¡1 in Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002).
16Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002) also suggest a simpler, but less eﬃcient estimator for
the model (A.1). This so-called minimum-distance estimator (MDE) relies on the quadratic
forms in (A.9)-(A.11). In a ﬁrst step a consistent estimate of ˆ ! is obtained by
ˆ !mde =
T ¡ 1
T
+
1
˜ ¾2
uNT2
N X
i=1
h
(∆yi ¡ ∆Qi˜ Á)0(vv0)(∆yi ¡ ∆Qi˜ Á)
i
where ˜ Á and ˜ ¾2
u are estimates that result form a consistent estimator, like the ﬁrst-diﬀerences
GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) that we have used in our empirical
analysis. Using ˆ !mde we obtain the minimum distance estimators for Á and ¾2
u from (A.9)-
(A.10).
17References
Ahn, S., and P. Schmidt (1995): “Eﬃcient Estimation of Models for Dynamic Panel Data,”
Journal of Econometrics, 68, 5–27.
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991): “Some Tests of Speciﬁcation for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” Review of Economic Studies,
58, 277–297.
Bellmann, L., and R. Jackman (1996): “Aggregate Impact Analysis,” in International Hand-
book of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation, ed. by G. Schmid, J. O’Reilly, and K. Sch¨ omann,
pp. 143–162. Edward Elgar.
Blien, U. (2002): “Ein Arbeitsmarktgesamtindikator zur regionalen Mittelverwendung f¨ ur die
aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik,” in IAB-Kompendium Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, ed. by
G. Kleinhenz. BeitrAB, BD. 250, 335-344.
Blundell, R., and S. Bond (1998): “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic
Panel Data Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115–143.
Blundell, R., S. Bond, and F. Windmeijer (2000): “Estimation in Dynamic Panel Data
Models: Improving on the Performance of the Standard GMM Estimators,” Working Paper
00/12, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Boeri, T., and M. Burda (1996): “Active Labor Market Policies, Job Matching and the
Czech Miracle,” European Economic Review, 40, 805–817.
Bond, S. (2002): “Dynamic Panal Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Prac-
tice,” Working Paper 09/02, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Bond, S., and F. Windmeijer (2002): “Finite Sample Inference for GMM Estimation in Linear
Panel Data Models,” cemmap working Paper cwp04/02, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Calmfors, L. (1994): “Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment - A Framework for
the Analysis of Crucial Design Features,” OECD Economic Studies, 22, 7–47.
Calmfors, L., A. Forslund, and M. Hemstr om (2002): “Does Active Labour Market
Policy Work? Lessons From The Swedish Experience,” CESifo working Paper no. 675(4),
CESifo.
Calmfors, L., and H. Lang (1995): “Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Active Labor Market Pro-
grammes in a Union-Wage-Setting Model,” Economic Journal, 105 (430), 601–619.
Calmfors, L., and P. Skedinger (1995): “Does Active Labour-Market Policy Increase Em-
ployment? Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence from Sweden,” Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 11 (1), 91–109.
Franz, W., and W. Smolny (1994): “The Measurement and Interpretation of Vacancy Data
and the Dynamics of the Beveridge Curve: The German Case,” in Measurement and Analysis
of Job Vacancies, ed. by J. Muysken. Aldershot.
Hagen, T. (2003): “Three Approaches to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policy in
East Germany using Regional Data,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-27, ZEW.
Heckman, J., R. LaLonde, and J. Smith (1999): “The Economics and Econometrics of Ac-
tive Labor Market Programs,” in Handbook of Labor Economics Vol.III, ed. by O. Ashenfelter,
and D. Card, pp. 1865–2097. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Holmlund, B., and J. Linden (1993): “Job Matching, Temporary Public Employment and
Equilibrium Unemployment,” Journal of Public Economics, 51, 329–343.
18Hsiao, C., M. Pesaran, and A. Tahmiscioglu (2002): “Maximum likelihood Estimation of
Fixed Eﬀects Dynamic Panel Data Models covering short time periods,” Journal of Econo-
metrics, 109, 107–150.
Hujer, R., U. Blien, M. Caliendo, and C. Zeiss (2002): “Macroeconometric Evaluation
of Active Labour Market Policies in Germany - A Dynamic Panel Approach Using Regional
Data,” Discussion Paper No. 616, IZA.
Hujer, R., M. Caliendo, and S. Thomsen (2003): “New Evidence on the Eﬀects of Job Cre-
ation Schemes in Germany - A Matching Approach with Threefold Heterogeneity,” Working
Paper, J.W.Goethe-University, Frankfurt.
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman (1991): Unemployment - Macroeconomic Perfor-
mance and the Labour Market. Oxford University Press, New York.
Lehmann, H. (1995): “Active Labour Market Policies in the OECD and in Selected Transition
Economies,” Working paper No. 539-96, World Bank Policy Reasearch.
OECD (1993): Employment Outlook. Paris.
Petrongolo, B., and C. Pissarides (2001): “Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the
Matching Function,” Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIX (June), 309–431.
Pissarides, C. (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press.
Puhani, P. (1999): Evaluating Active Labour Market Policies - Empirical Evidence for Poland
During Transition.ZEW Economic Studies, Vol.5. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, New York.
Windmeijer, F. (2000): “A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Two-Step
Estimators,” Working Paper 00/19, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
19IZA Discussion Papers 
 
No. 
 
 
Author(s) Title 
 
Area Date 
901  P. F. Orazem          
M. Vodopivec 
 
Do Market Pressures Induce Economic 
Efficiency: The Case of Slovenian 
Manufacturing, 1994-2001 
 
4 10/03 
902  P. Frijters                
M. A. Shields           
S. Wheatley Price 
 
Immigrant Job Search in the UK: Evidence from 
Panel Data 
1 10/03 
903  S. Girma                 
H. Görg     
 
Evaluating the Causal Effects of Foreign 
Acquisition on Domestic Skilled and Unskilled 
Wages 
 
2 10/03 
904  S. P. Jenkins           
P. Van Kerm 
 
Trends in Income Inequality, Pro-Poor Income 
Growth and Income Mobility 
1 10/03 
905  D. Weichselbaumer  
R. Winter-Ebmer 
 
Rhetoric in Economic Research: The Case of 
Gender Wage Differentials 
7 10/03 
906  D. Weichselbaumer  
R. Winter-Ebmer 
 
A Meta-Analysis of the International Gender 
Wage Gap 
7 10/03 
907  A. Dupuy                  
L. Borghans 
 
Supply and Demand, Allocation and Wage 
Inequality: An International Comparison 
1 10/03 
908  M. Leonardi  Product Demand Shifts and Wage Inequality 
 
1 10/03 
909  M. Leonardi  Firm Heterogeneity in Capital/Labor Ratios and 
Wage Inequality 
 
1 10/03 
910  P. Díaz-Vázquez     
D. Snower 
 
On-the-Job Training, Firing Costs and 
Employment 
5 10/03 
911  J. Wagner  Are Nascent Entrepreneurs Jacks-of-all-Trades? 
A Test of Lazear's Theory of Entrepreneurship 
with German Data 
 
5 10/03 
912  D. Checchi               
A. Filippin 
 
An Experimental Study of the POUM Hypothesis  1  10/03 
913  S. Pivnenko            
D. DeVoretz 
 
The Recent Economic Performance of Ukrainian 
Immigrants in Canada and the U.S. 
1 10/03 
914  A. R. Cardoso         
P. Portugal 
 
Bargained Wages, Wage Drift and the Design of 
the Wage Setting System 
5 10/03 
915  R. Hujer                   
C. Zeiss 
 
Macroeconomic Impacts of ALMP on the 
Matching Process in West Germany 
6 10/03 
 
An updated list of IZA Discussion Papers is available on the center‘s homepage www.iza.org. 